

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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O P 171330 Z APR 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1954

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0166

EXDIS/ SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON' S STATEMENT OF APRIL 17, 1973

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
AT THE APRIL 17, 1973 SALT MEETING.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

APRIL 17, 1973

MR. MINISTER,

I.

THIS MORNING IS AN APPROPRIATE OCCASION TO REVIEW THE RESULTS
OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE THUS FAR IN SALT
TWO. THIS EXCHANGE HAS NOW BEEN IN PROGRESS FOR TEN WEEKS --
FIVE LAST YEAR AND FIVE THUS FAR IN 1973. I WANT TO SUMMARIZE
BRIEFLY MY VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, SO AS TO SEEK
TO IDENTIFY THOSE AREAS IN WHICH THE SIDES SHOULD CONCENTRATE
THEIR EFFORTS TO OVERCOME SERIOUS DIFFERENCES, AS WELL AS THOSE
AREAS IN WHICH THERE APPEARS TO BE A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS.

I BELIEVE WE ARE AGREED THAT OUR FUNDAMENTAL TASK IS THE
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WORKING OUT OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO REPLACE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AS STATED IN ARTICLE VIII THEREOF. EACH SIDE HAS ADDRESSED THE PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS WHICH IT BELIEVES SHOULD GUIDE THIS PROCESS. WHILE THIS DIALOGUE HAS THUS FAR FAILED TO PRODUCE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING, I BELIEVE THAT THE US POSITION IN THIS REGARD HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR. ANY PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST PROVIDE EQUAL SECURITY WITH NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO EITHER SIDE AND MUST PROVIDE FOR ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. IN ORDER NOT TO AFFECT OBLIGATIONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES EARLIER ASSUMED, SUCH AN AGREEMENT MUST NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SECURITY OF OUR ALLIES OR OUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT THE US OBLIGATIONS TO OUR ALLIANCES. I HOPE THE SOVIET SIDE WILL GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE CONCEPTS WE HAVE PRESENTED AND WILL BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THEM MORE FULLY FOLLOWING THE RECESS.

II.

A MAJOR PORTION OF OUR EXCHANGES HAS DEALT WITH THE VIEWS OF THE TWO SIDES REGARDING THE MAIN ELEMENTS TO BE INCLUDED IN A PERMANENT AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS PUT FORWARD A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS. I WILL REVIEW THE SOVIET APPROACH AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, ALONG WITH THE RESPONSES WHICH THE US SIDE HAS GIVEN.

THE ISSUE OF LIMITATIONS ON THE CENTRAL SYSTEMS WHICH DOMINATE THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IS CRUCIAL. THE SOVIET SIDE WISHES INDEFINITELY TO MAINTAIN THE INEQUALITIES IN THE NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND IN ICBM THROW-WEIGHT AS PROVIDED FOR A TEMPORARY PERIOD IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. FURTHERMORE, THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSED TO ELIMINATE HEAVY BOMBERS FROM THE STRATEGIC EQUATION BY PLACING A BAN ON THEIR CARRYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE US SIDE HAS MADE ITS POSITION CLEAR; THE LEVELS PERMITTED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHILE ACCEPTABLE FOR A TEMPORARY FREEZE, ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT REPLACING THE INTERIM AGREEMENT PROVIDE THAT BOTH SIDES BE PERMITTED AN EQUAL AGGREGATE NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS PROPOSED TO ELIMINATE THE BOMBER ARMAMENTS NECESSARY TO ENSURE PENETRATION OF ITS EXTENSIVE CURRENTLY DEPLOYED AIR DEFENSES BUT HAS INDICATED REFUSAL TO DISCUSS LIMITS ON AIR DEFENSES. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR

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OUR POSITION THAT WE CANNOT CONSIDER LIMITS ON BOMBER ARMAMENTS, WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO PENETRATE AIR DEFENSES, WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF APPROPRIATE LIMITS ON AIR DEFENSES. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM HEAVY BOMBERS IS UNACCEPTABLE.

THE SOVIET DELEGATION CONTINUES TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF CERTAIN US NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS. IT HAS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THESE SYSTEMS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE TERRITORY OF OUR ALLIES AND THEIR BASES DISMANTLED. THE US DELEGATION HAS REJECTED THIS ONE- SIDED APPROACH. THE US POSITION ON THE SUBJECT OF NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS WAS MADE CLEAR IN OUR STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 18, 1972. WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE ASYMMETRIES IN NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS DO NOT FAVOR THE US. WE HAVE STATED REPEATEDLY THAT OUR PRIMARY TASK IS TO WORK OUT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF THE TWO SIDES. ONCE AN UNDERSTANDING IS REACHED ON THE LIMITATIONS TO BE APPLIED TO THE CENTRAL SYSTEMS, THEN THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THE NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS OF BOTH THE US AND THE USSR. IN ANY SUCH DISCUSSION, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS OF BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED. IN AGREEING TO ANY SUCH DISCUSSION, THE US WOULD NOT THEREBY BE ACKNOWLEDGING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CLAIM THAT US NON- CENTRAL SYSTEMS ARE " STRATEGIC" OR SHOULD BE INCLUDED AS AN ELEMENT IN THE COMPOSITION OF AN OVERALL AGGREGATE.

THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS ADVOCATED THE INCLUSION OF QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS IN AN AGREEMENT, BUT HAS NOT PUT FORWARD SPECIFIC IDEAS. LIKEWISE, THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS EXPRESSED ITS SUPPORT OF THE CONCEPT OF REDUCTIONS, BUT WITHOUT REVEALING THE LEVELS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IT HAS IN MIND OR HOW REDUCTIONS WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED.

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ACTION SS-25

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FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1955
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0166

EXDIS/ SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS INTRODUCED AND EXPRESSED IN SEVERAL FORMS A CONCEPT OF WHAT IT TERMS " RESTRAINT," AND SAID IT WOULD APPLY TO BOTH SIDES. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON THIS SUBJECT HAS THUS FAR ONLY BEEN PRESENTED IN VERY GENERAL TERMS. HOWEVER, THE LANGUAGE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL CREATES SERIOUS DOUBTS AS TO ITS CONSISTENCY WITH THE BASIC PRINCIPLES WHICH MUST GUIDE OUR NEGOTIATIONS. FURTHERMORE, SOVIET PROPOSALS HAVE IDENTIFIED FOR RESTRAINT ONLY ONGOING US PROGRAMS WITHOUT IDENTIFYING FOR RESTRAINT ANY ONGOING SOVIET PROGRAMS. IN ANY EVENT, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO CONSIDER THIS SUBJECT BEFORE WE HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS TO BE PLACED ON CENTRAL SYSTEMS.

THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS PROPOSED A BAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF CERTAIN " OTHER" STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. THE US DELEGATION NOTED ON DECEMBER 12 THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON SOME OF THESE POINTS AND DISAGREEMENT ON OTHERS. THIS STATEMENT REMAINS VALID TODAY.

THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS PROPOSED THAT THE SIDES ASSUME OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO WHAT IS KNOWN AS " NON- TRANSFER." MY STATEMENT OF APRIL 12 SET FORTH THE US APPROACH TO THIS SUBJECT.

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III.

THE US OBJECTIVE THROUGHOUT SALT TWO HAS BEEN TO WORK OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WOULD REPLACE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. TO THIS END, THE US DELEGATION HAS PUT FORWARD BOTH GENERAL CONCEPTS AND SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH SIDES. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO REVIEW BRIEFLY US PROPOSALS AND THE SOVIET RESPONSES AS I UNDERSTAND THEM.

WE HAVE PROPOSED NUMERICALLY EQUAL CEILINGS FOR THE TWO SIDES BE ESTABLISHED FOR AN AGGREGATE CONSISTING OF ICBM AND SLBM

LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS, WITH AN APPROPRIATE PROVISION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF ONE TYPE OF DELIVERY VEHICLE FOR ANOTHER WITHIN THE AGREED CEILINGS. SUCH A LIMITATION WOULD SET BOUNDS UPON THE OVERALL CAPABILITIES OF STRATEGIC FORCES WITH NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO EITHER SIDE. ONCE THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL NUMBERS IS ACCEPTED FOR THIS AGGREGATE, THE WAY WOULD BE OPEN TO NEGOTIATE ITS LEVEL. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS RESPONDED NEGATIVELY.

WITHIN THE AGGREGATE, THE US HAS PROPOSED AN EQUAL CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF ICBM LAUNCHERS EACH SIDE MAY DEPLOY. SUCH A CEILING, WHICH WE CONSIDER A NECESSARY STEP IN ESTABLISHING ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE, AND THEREBY PROVIDING FOR EQUAL SECURITY AND NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WOULD CONSTRAIN THAT COMPONENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES WHICH POSES THE GREATEST POTENTIAL THREAT TO THE DETERRENT FORCES OF THE OTHER SIDE. THE SOVIET SIDE APPARENTLY WOULD MAINTAIN INDEFINITELY INEQUALITY IN THESE LEVELS.

THE US HAS ALSO PROPOSED THAT AN AGREEMENT ESTABLISH EQUAL CEILINGS ON THE AGGREGATE THROW- WEIGHT OF THE ICBM FORCE OF EACH SIDE. IN THE CONTEXT OF ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE AND STRATEGIC STABILITY, THE LIMITATION OF ICBM THROW- WEIGHT IS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE. A NUMERICAL LIMIT ALONE ON ICBM LAUNCHERS WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT, SINCE IT WOULD NOT DEAL WITH THE EXISTING AND POTENTIAL IMBALANCES IN THE ICBM THROW- WEIGHT OF THE TWO SIDES. SUCH A CEILING WOULD BE A DEFINITE AND CLEAR WAY OF LIMITING THE LONG- TERM POTENTIAL OF THE ICBM FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS REJECTED THE US PROPOSAL AND WOULD APPARENTLY MAINTAIN INDEFINITELY THE INEQUALITY OF THE PRESENT
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LIMITATIONS WHILE LEAVING OPEN A WAY FOR SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASING THE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF ICBM FORCES.

JUST AS THE ABM TREATY PROVIDED FOR EQUAL LIMITS ON THE SIGNIFICANT PARAMETERS OF ABM SYSTEMS, WE HAVE PROPOSED LIMITS EQUAL FOR THE TWO SIDES ON THREE MAJOR PARAMETERS WHICH GOVERN THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THESE LIMITATIONS WOULD BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE CONCEPT OF ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE WHICH PROVIDES THE APPROPRIATE BASIS ON WHICH TO BUILD AN EQUITABLE PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THIS CONCEPT RECOGNIZES THAT NATIONS DO NOT FOLLOW IDENTICAL ROUTES TOWARD NATIONAL SECURITY AND WILL NOT NECESSARILY DESIRE IDENTICAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CONCEPT PROVIDES THAT THE SIDES SHOULD BE LIMITED TO ESSENTIALLY EQUAL STRATEGIC CAPABILITY.

AS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY STATED, IN THE ABSENCE OF ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS RESULTING IN A SITUATION

OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE SOVIET UNION, I DO NOT SEE THE
POSSIBILITY OF REACHING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

IV.

MR. MINISTER, THIS COMPLETES MY BRIEF REVIEW OF WHERE WE STAND
TODAY. I THINK BOTH SIDES WOULD AGREE THAT, AS WE SURVEY THE
RESULTS OF OUR JOINT WORK TO DATE, WE FIND AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS
WHICH HAS BEEN USEFUL, BUT WE ARE STILL FAR SHORT OF A COMMON
APPROACH TO DEVELOPING AN EQUITABLE PERMANENT AGREEMENT. JOHNSON

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